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The Digital Services Tax on the Verge 
of Implementation
Wei Cui*
P R É C I S
La France a adopté la taxe sur les services numériques (TSN) en 2019, et le Royaume-Uni, 
l’Espagne, l’Italie et d’autres pays snt en voie de promulguer des législations pour 
l’adoption de taxes semblables. La TSN peut être vue comme une taxe sur les loyers 
basée sur le lieu (LBL), et résut sans doute des problèmes vraiment nouveaux en 
matière de fiscalité internationale. L’auteur passe brièvement en revue cette justification 
de la TSN et examine plus en détail la TSN à la lumière de trois critiques. La première 
critique est que certaines caractéristiques de la TSN la rendent semblable aux droits 
douaniers sur les importations créant une distorsion. La deuxième est que la TSN ne 
serait pas payée par les plateformes numériques, mais serait simplement transférée aux 
utilisateurs des plateformes. La troisième est que les gouvernements qui font la 
promotion de la TSN ne semblent pas la caractériser comme une taxe sur les LBL; ils ont 
plutôt préconisé une réforme de l’impôt sur le revenu. L’auteur propose des moyens de 
rationaliser les caractéristiques de la TSN qui l’apparentent à un droit douanier, réfute les 
arguments superficiels sur l’effet de la TSN, et offre un cadre pour comprendre pourquoi 
les petites économies pourraient plaider simultanément en faveur de la TSN et d’une 
réforme de l’imposition du revenu à l’échelle internationale. 
A B S T R A C T
France enacted the digital services tax (DST) in 2019, and similar legislation is pending in 
the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and other countries. The DST can be viewed as a tax on 
location-specific rent (LSR), and it arguably slves genuinely new problems in 
international taxation. The author briefly reviews this justification of the DST and further 
examines the DST design in light of three criticisms. The first criticism is that certain 
features of the DST render it similar to distortionary import tariffs. The second is that the 
DST would not be borne by digital platforms but would only be shifted to platform users. 
The third is that governments promoting the DST seem not to characterize it as a tax on 
LSR but, instead, have advocated reforming the income tax. The author suggests ways of 
rationalizing the DST’s tariff-like features, refutes casual arguments about the DST’s 
incidence, and offers a framework for understanding why small economies might 
advocate simultaneously for the DST and for the reformation of international income 
taxation.
* Of the Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2018, the European Council and the UK government each proposed to 
introduce a digital services tax (DST), to be levied on the revenue that large digital 
platform companies earn from advertising, online intermediation, or the transmis-
sion of data.1 To justify their respective proposals, these governments argued that 
the international income tax regime currently applicable to multinational companies 
results in the undertaxation of such companies, and that the regime must be reformed 
soon in order to allocate greater taxing rights to jurisdictions where digital platform 
users create value. They proceeded to present the DST as a short-term remedy for 
the undertaxation of digital platforms, pending a new consensus on multilateral tax 
reform within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).
DST proposals may represent the most intriguing global development in tax pol-
icy in recent years. Most academic and policy commentators have been surprised 
by how quickly these proposals have followed—and now threaten to overtake—the 
OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project, which national governments 
only recently began to implement. Even the basic idea of a DST, let alone a detailed 
idea of its design, was unheard of before late 2017, and yet the governments of num-
erous countries have already seized upon the idea and demonstrated substantial 
resolve regarding its implementation. In July 2019, France formally enacted DST 
legislation, with DST liabilities applicable retroactively to the beginning of 2019.2 In 
the same month, the UK government, contemplating a UK DST, released detailed 
1 United Kingdom, HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position Paper Update 
(London, UK: HM Treasury, March 2018) (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/689240/corporate_tax_and_the_digital 
_economy_update_web.pdf ); European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, Proposal 
for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting 
from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, COM/2018/0148 final, March 21, 2018.
2 France, République française, “Loi no 2019-759 du 24 juillet 2019 portant création d’une taxe 
sur les services numériques et modification de la trajectoire de baisse de l’impôt sur les 
sociétés,” Legifrance.gouv.fr, 24 juillet 2019 (www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPreparation.do 
?idDocument=JORFDOLE000038203221&type=general&typeLoi=proj&legislature=15).
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proposed legislative language, draft administrative guidance, and further policy 
explanations.3 Although the near-term future of UK policymaking is highly un-
certain under Boris Johnson’s government, the DST legislation is scheduled to be 
included in the fall 2019 budget, which would result in the tax’s taking effect in 
April 2020. Spain, Austria, and the Czech Republic have also introduced DST legis-
lation. It is widely anticipated that more countries may do the same.
Among the many fascinating features of the DST is that, prior to its delinea-
tion by various governments, it had no intellectual proponent. The DST had not 
been anticipated in the academic literature, and the idea of it seems to have been 
plucked out of thin air by bureaucrats and politicians. Partly for this reason, much 
of the initial commentary on the DST treated it as a policy proposal with no intel-
lectual substance, and as motivated purely by protectionism, populism, or political 
opportunism. Only since 2018 have scholars begun to seriously analyze this novel 
policy instrument.4 Elsewhere, I have offered a rationalization of the DST as a tax on 
location-specific rent (LSR).5 That is, many countries already levy royalties, rent 
taxes, and the corporate income tax on natural resource extraction; one can think 
of the DST as a tax on economic rents earned by digital platform companies from 
particular locations. Taxes on LSR possess two highly desirable features. First, they 
generate tax revenue with minimal distortions to business decisions. Second, rent 
that can be attributed to specific locations permits a natural allocation of taxing 
rights: the jurisdictions in which the rent is located can reasonably claim primary 
taxing rights, and this in turn implies natural solutions to coordination problems in 
mitigating the risk of excessive taxation. Once platform rent is seen as location-
specific, familiar tax policy frameworks become available for analyzing the DST. For 
example, the choice between a revenue-based tax and a tax defined over a rent base 
is familiar in the context of taxing natural resources. Revenue-based royalties on 
3 United Kingdom, HM Revenue and Customs, “Introduction of the New Digital Services Tax, 
Draft Legislation,” July 11, 2019 (www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-the 
-new-digital-services-tax); United Kingdom, HM Revenue and Customs, Digital Services Tax 
Draft Guidance (London, UK: HM Revenue and Customs, July 11, 2019) (https://assets 
.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
817666/20190711_-_Draft_Guidance_vfinal.pdf ); and United Kingdom, HM Treasury, 
Digital Service Tax: Response to the Consultation (London, UK: HM Treasury, July 2019) 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment 
_data/file/816389/DST_response_document_web.pdf ).
4 For recent scholarship sympathetic to the DST, see Wolfram Richter, “The Economics of the 
Digital Services Tax,” July 2019 (www.wiwi.tu-dortmund.de/wiwi/de/forschung/gebiete/
fp-richter/workinprogress/FPR-WORI-WIP-TheEconomicsoftheDigitalServicesTax.pdf ); 
Daniel Shaviro, “Digital Service Taxes and the Broader Shift from Determining the Source of 
Income to Taxing Location-Specific Rents,” September 2019 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3448070).
5 Wei Cui, “The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense,” Tax Law Review (forthcoming); 
and Wei Cui, “The Superiority of the Digital Services Tax over ‘Significant Digital Presence’ 
Proposals,” National Tax Journal (forthcoming).
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resource extraction are frequently adopted alongside rent taxes and income tax, and 
the DST can straightforwardly be analogized to resource royalties.6
As the implementation of real-world DSTs begins, however, it is important to 
comment on certain discrepancies between the rationalization of the DST as a tax on 
LSR on the one hand, and actual DST design on the other. Such discrepancies fall 
into at least three categories. First, critics of the DST, while they have emphasized 
features of the tax that resemble import tariffs or that amount to a distortionary tax 
on business-to-business (“B2B”) transactions, have downplayed significant applica-
tions of the DST from which these features are absent. The presentation of the DST 
as a tax on LSR, by contrast, has stressed these other applications. Just as it is wrong 
for DST critics to continue to ignore the rent-tax features of DSTs, it is arguably 
wrong for DST proponents to omit discussion of the tariff-like features of the DST 
or its potential distortions of B2B transactions. Alternative or additional justifica-
tions for the DST must be considered.
Second, the characterization of the DST as a tax on LSR provides a framework for 
analyzing the DST’s economic incidence. Others have predicted different incidence 
effects, even claiming that such predictions have been confirmed by real-world 
observations. It is illuminating to compare the predicted incidence effects of a tax 
on LSR with these actual observed price changes that seem to have followed the 
DST’s adoption. For example, Amazon recently announced that it would charge 
merchants in France a higher commission that corresponded to the DST rate.7
Third, and finally, it must be acknowledged that the national governments that 
are enacting the DST have refrained from promoting it as a tax on LSR. Instead, they 
continue to justify the DST as an interim measure, pending the satisfactory reform 
of international income taxation. It is rather unlikely, however, that the corporate 
income tax can be converted into a tax on LSR. Indeed, the traditional expectation 
has been that taxes on economic rent will be imposed independently of the income 
tax: the two are far from being interchangeable. It is thus important to reflect on 
whether the conception of the DST as a tax on LSR may ultimately gain some polit-
ical, as distinct from merely intellectual, purchase.
In this paper, I tackle these issues in order. In the first section, I briefly review 
the analysis of the DST as a tax on LSR, emphasizing central examples of the DST’s 
application in which it neither is tariff-like nor bears on B2B transactions. In the 
second section, I discuss applications of the DST in which it has a tariff-like effect 
or distorts B2B transactions, and I describe justifications for the DST that may be 
offered in spite of these effects. In the third section, I consider the perceived conflict 
6 This is elaborated in Wei Cui and Nigar Hashimzade, The Digital Services Tax as a Tax on 
Location-Specific Rent, CESifo Working Paper no. 7737 (Munich: Munich Society for the 
Promotion of Economic Research, 2019) (www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7737.pdf ).
7 “Amazon Says French Clients To Bear Cost of France’s New Digital Tax,” Courthouse News 
Service.com, August 1, 2019 (www.courthousenews.com/amazon-says-french-clients-to-bear 
-cost-of-frances-new-digital-tax).
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between the characterization of the DST as a tax on rent and the observation that 
the DST apparently leads to price changes. In the fourth and final section, I discuss 
the reasons for expecting the focus in the discourse on international tax reform to 
gradually move from income taxation to the taxation of LSR.
THE DST AS A  TAX ON LOCATION-SPECIFIC 
PLATFORM RENT
Governments proposing the DST in 2018 appealed to a notion of “user value cre-
ation” that many critics have objected to as merely metaphorical and indeterminate 
in meaning. However, it is possible to give the phrase “user value creation” a precise 
interpretation: it is a matter of identifying specific locational origins of producer or 
consumer surplus.
Consider a hypothetical company, “Googl,” that has developed a technology 
(“Search Algorithm”) and thereby incurred large fixed costs and ongoing research 
and development (R & D) expenses. Googl designs a Web interface in country X’s 
language, mainly for individual users in country X; Googl has developed interfaces 
in many other languages for other countries. The interface requires an upfront 
investment and maintenance spending. Googl operates servers in a low-tax jurisdic-
tion (country  Z) in order to support Search Algorithm and multiple interfaces, 
consuming much of country Z’s electricity supply. Despite these very large non-
marginal costs, Googl’s marginal cost from its main revenue-generating business— 
that is, the targeted placement of advertisements based on user searches—is almost 
zero. The prices that Googl is able to charge purchasers of advertising are well 
above marginal cost because of the market power that Googl possesses.
Consider, specifically, one line of Googl’s business: ad placement on the coun-
try X interface, targeted at users in country X. Among the purchasers of advertising 
space on Googl are not only country X businesses but also producers and sellers of 
goods and services from other countries, including country Y. Because of (nearly) 
zero marginal cost, the revenue that Googl earns during a given period from ads 
targeted at country X consumers and paid by country Y producers (this revenue is 
RXY) is roughly its gross profit from this business. Suppose that after the allocation 
and deduction of the non-marginal costs (for example, electricity and server depre-
ciation) incurred by Googl in country Z against this profit during the same period, 
net profit πXY remains. (The computation of πXY does not yet take into account 
Googl’s other fixed expenditures—for example, R & D.)
It seems plausible to attribute πXY to country X, if the following two conditions 
are met:
1. The production functions and supply curves of producers in country Y (that
is, the purchasers of ad space) do not change because of Search Algorithm or
Googl’s country X interface.
2. Googl’s earning of the profit πXY does not interfere with its deployment of
Search Algorithm in other countries.
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The logic of such profit attribution runs as follows. First, the satisfaction of condi-
tion 1 allows the following argument: RXY is extracted from additional producer 
surplus that producers in country Y expect to earn by making sales to consumers in 
country X. But if such expected surplus arises even if production functions have 
not changed, it must come from an expected shift in the demand curve of the con-
sumers in country X, caused by the ads placed on Googl. Nothing, however, has 
happened in country Y to generate the possibility of the interaction between Googl 
and country Y sellers. Second, the satisfaction of condition 2 leads to the argument 
that since the deployment of Search Algorithm in country X has no opportunity 
costs, one can view the entire profit (πXY) as earned from country X. This is the case 
even if the infrastructural support for the platform is located in country  Z. The 
reason is that while this infrastructure is entirely mobile, πXY is immobile because it 
can be earned only in connection with country X.
Therefore, if conditions 1 and 2 both obtain, Googl’s profit, earned from coun-
try  Y producers, can be said to have an origin in country  X—the origin being 
country X consumers’ engagement with the Googl platform. It is important to note 
that, although advertisers and individuals doing online searches are all “users” of 
Googl, condition 1 articulates a situation where one can say that “user value creation” 
arises in one of the two user jurisdictions, but not the other. In particular, the sig-
nificant value creation in this case occurs in the consumer jurisdiction. Moreover, 
the amount of value created can be measured (rather than being indeterminate). 
Before costs are taken into account, this amount is at least RXY, since this is the least 
amount that producer surplus in country  Y is expected to increase as a result of 
country X’s users’ interactions with Googl (it is at least πXY after taking into account 
Googl’s fixed costs).
How can country  X capture a portion of Googl’s profit that reflects “value 
creation” in the sense just identified? One possibility is for country X to impose a 
low-rate tax on RXY, which would be equivalent to a higher-rate tax on πXY. Since 
RXY is earned by Googl in the form of payments from country Y, country X cannot 
impose such a tax by levying an import tariff or a traditional withholding tax: there 
is no payment from country X corresponding to RXY for such a levy to bear on. 
Figure 1 illustrates this misalignment between value creation and source of payment. 
Instead, country X must ask Googl to voluntarily report and remit the tax on RXY. 
This is how a DST would apply to Googl. One of the basic innovations of the DST 
is that it tackles the misalignment between payment and value creation, which is 
made administratively possible when Googl, as a large multinational company, can 
be expected to comply with the DST obligation even in the absence of country X’s 
ability to track payments from country Y.
Even though the tax on advertising revenue earned by Googl is not a tariff in 
this particular case, it is a tax on B2B transactions. Does such a tax necessarily re-
duce production efficiency by distorting the relative costs of country Y firms’ choice 
of inputs? The answer is no. First, it is quite conceivable that Googl would not 
change the price of advertising, if (1) it had already set the price of advertising at 
profit-maximizing levels (and its profit already allows the recovery of fixed costs), 
the digital services tax on the verge of implementation  n  1141
and (2)  the marginal cost of advertising is zero. In such a case, Googl’s profit-
maximizing price before the application of the DST remains the profit-maximizing 
price after the DST. Second, if Googl changes its price of advertising in response to 
the DST, country Y producers may change their advertising strategies, but this is 
arguably still distinct from changing inputs to production. Country Y producers’ 
profits may decline, but it is not at all clear that the overall welfare effect of the DST 
is negative.
The ideas motivating the foregoing arguments can be re-enforced by a second 
hypothetical example. Another tech company—call it AirBB—has developed a tech-
nology, “Sharing Economy,” that intermediates between consumers in need of 
short-term accommodation and property owners. AirBB has a cost structure similar 
to Googl’s—that is, a large fixed cost of investment in technology, additional fixed 
costs associated with country interfaces, and zero marginal costs in facilitating 
transactions. The infrastructural support for AirBB’s country interfaces, which can 
be located in any country, is, again, located in country Z. AirBB earns revenue from 
charging consumers who (1)  book accommodation located in country  X, and 
(2) may reside in another country, Y. After deducting fixed costs allocable against 
this revenue (RXY), AirBB’s profit from this line of business is πXY.
An important difference between Googl and AirBB is that the latter’s revenue is 
extracted from consumers, as a result of additional consumer surplus that the digital 
platform creates. This surplus arises thanks to the ability of AirBB to reduce trans-
action costs for property owners and bring them to market. Therefore, it is plausible 
to postulate that instead of condition 1, an analogue condition holds: condition 1*. 
The demand curve of country Y consumers does not change because of Sharing 
Economy or the country X interface. (Condition 2 continues to hold for AirBB.)
Both landlords and tourists are users of AirBB. However, condition 1* posits that 
“user value creation” arises mainly in the producer’s jurisdiction: changes in the 
supply curve are causally responsible for the increase in consumer surplus, which in 
turn generates revenue for AirBB. For this reason, it is plausible to attribute the 
latter’s profit to country X and not to country Y.
FIGURE 1
Individual users
in country X
Advertisers
in country Y
Googl
Sales of advertised goods/services
Payments for goods and services
Free search
service
User
participation
Purchase of
advertising
slots
Access to
eyeballs of
individuals
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As in the Googl example, there is a misalignment between the country of value 
creation (country X) and the source of payment (country Y). Figure 2 illustrates this 
misalignment for AirBB. It is not possible for country X’s government to extract a 
share of AirBB’s profit earned from consumers in country Y by levying a tariff or 
withholding tax. Instead, a DST imposed by country X on RXY must be voluntarily 
reported and remitted by AirBB. In AirBB’s business model, fees collected from 
landlords in country X may constitute an additional revenue stream subject to the 
DST. But at least the DST imposed on RXY, collected from guests in country Y, would 
not be a tax on B2B transactions. There arises no issue of distortionary impact on 
production choices.
Might AirBB pass the cost of the DST on to its guest users? Again, two points 
need to be made. First, if AirBB’s marginal cost is zero, and if it has already set its 
price at profit-maximizing levels before the introduction of the DST, then the theor-
etical prediction is that AirBB cannot increase its after-tax profits by increasing its 
prices. Second, suppose that AirBB, in response to the DST, does for some reason 
increase the prices that it charges to guest users; this would result in a wealth trans-
fer from country Y guests to country X’s government. It is not always clear why this 
reduces welfare, whereas the sense in which country X has claimed a greater share 
of the “value created” in it is rather evident.
The examples of Googl and AirBB illustrate some central applications of the DST. 
A prominent feature of current DST proposals is their relatively narrow scope. Plat-
form revenue from online advertising (especially advertising on social media and 
search platforms) and from fees and commissions from online intermediation con-
stitutes the main tax base. The online provision of digital content and services is 
generally carved out of the DST scope, as are systems of online payment and online 
messaging and communication. One natural interpretation of the scope of the DST’s 
application and exemptions is that the DST is focused on platforms that serve dis-
tinct groups of users, where (1) one group of users is subsidized while profit is made 
from another group of users, and (2)  it is a relatively pervasive phenomenon for 
these groups of users to be situated in different countries. Thus, in cases of online 
content provision (gaming, for example, and video and music streaming), the most 
prominent platform users (that is, gamers, and consumers of video and music) are 
not the groups subsidized. These users pay for the value generated by users on the 
other side (that is, creators of content), so they do not represent sources of value 
creation that are unmatched by payment.8 In the case of online payment and com-
munication systems, the task of identifying which side is subsidized may be 
sufficiently difficult that mismatches between value creation and sources of payment 
raise less of a policy concern.
By contrast, online advertising and online intermediation are precisely the plat-
forms that offer the clearest possibility of aiming different pricing strategies at 
8 And, unlike the countries of AirBB landlords, countries where creators of online content reside 
may feel that they already extract sufficient value from platform transactions. There is no great 
misalignment between value creation and payment.
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different groups of users located in different countries. These examples show that 
the DST responds to two novel problems in international taxation. First, two-sided 
business models operating at a global scale create misalignments between sources of 
value creation and origins of payment. Second, non-rival use and remote deploy-
ment of digital technology generate a significant new class of location-specific rent. 
With respect to the problem of misalignment, the DST offers a solution that argu-
ably is not feasible under the income tax or any pre-existing tax instrument. And 
with respect to the problem of new types of LSR, although the DST is not the only 
possible solution (as I discuss in the next section of this paper), it certainly comes 
closer to a solution than does any other existing proposal.
ARE DSTS TARIFF-LIKE ,  AND IF  THEY CAN BE , 
SO WHAT?
Although I believe that the examples discussed above offer the most compelling 
illustrations of DST design, other applications of real-world DSTs (enacted or pro-
posed) cannot be rationalized in the same way. For example, readers may have 
noted that in the Googl and AirBB examples, the producers purchasing advertise-
ments from Googl and the guests booking accommodation on AirBB may come 
from country X—that is, the same country where users of Googl’s search engine and 
AirBB landlords are located. In such cases, the place of LSR is the same as the source 
of payment; the DST would apply even in the absence of any misalignment between 
the two. Indeed, it may be that real-world DSTs cover more transactions among 
domestic parties than transactions among users from different countries: for example, 
Amazon France may mainly mediate transactions among French sellers and French 
buyers; and Uber’s UK app may mainly facilitate rides given by UK drivers to UK 
passengers. Any DST imposed on the platform companies would still be concep-
tually and legally distinct from tariffs (and withholding taxes): conceptually, a DST 
imposed on revenue from advertising that is targeted at French users is distinct from 
a tax on revenue from French advertisers; and, legally, the obligation of DST re-
mittance lies with the payee and not the payer. In many cases, however, the DST 
FIGURE 2
Individual landlords
in country X
Country Y
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Payment for short-term rental
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would be imposed on the same transactions as hypothetical tariffs or withholding 
taxes on foreign providers of digital services would apply to.
Moreover, although the argument can be made, in the case of advertising, that 
advertising expenditures represent fixed rather than marginal costs of production 
and that, therefore, a tax on the purchase of advertising (a B2B transaction) would 
not affect marginal production decisions, there are clearly other instances in which 
DST does alter marginal costs. The most obvious example is fees charged on the 
basis of the value of online transactions. When Amazon Marketplace charges online 
sellers a higher commission (purportedly as a result of the introduction of the DST), 
the online sellers’ marginal costs clearly increase. Whether the DST is distortionary 
thus crucially depends on the understanding of DST incidence—of whether, and 
why, Amazon would pass on the DST cost.
These examples raise the following question: If the DST would have effects 
similar to those of tariffs on the import of services, and if it might distort production 
decisions, would it still be justifiable as a solution to new problems in international 
taxation? Certainly, opponents of the DST have rushed to compare DSTs to “protec-
tionist” tariffs, and they have asserted that DSTs are in violation of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules (although no details have yet been offered to substantiate 
such comparisons).9 Such comparisons and assertions seem not to apply at all to the 
examples that I discussed in the previous section of this paper: it is not at all clear 
what WTO rules, if any, would apply to a tax imposed by country X on the revenue 
that Googl or AirBB receives from country Y. However, where the DST applies to 
platforms that link users from the same country, or where the DST distorts decisions 
about business input purchases, such critiques of the DST may be relevant.
There has, in fact, been a recent surge of unilateral tax policy instruments that 
appear to have tariff-like effects. Many of them are independent of, and in some 
cases precede, the introduction of the DST. The US base erosion and anti-abuse tax 
(BEAT),10 which formed an important part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 
denies deductions for a wide range of services imported into the United States, 
purportedly to ensure a minimal tax base for US companies.11 The denial of a deduc-
tion has the same effect as a tariff on the input purchase generating the expense. 
The Indian equalization levy on foreign providers of advertising services to Indian 
firms is another example. One rationalization for such policies draws on the “strategic 
trade” literature.12 When countries have sufficient market power in global goods or 
9 See for example, “Trade Law Analysis of EU’s Digital Tax Proposal,” Lexology.com, September 6, 
2018 (www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3a817cf7-28c7-42fd-ad68-a5ae4b300c9c).
10 The US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. no. 115-97, has introduced base erosion and anti-abuse 
tax (BEAT) regime.
11 For a recent critical analysis, see Chris William Sanchirico, “Earnings Stripping Under the 
BEAT,” Tax Law Review (forthcoming) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3395416).
12 Joseph Bankman, Mitchell Kane, and Alan Sykes, “Collecting the Rent: The Global Battle To 
Capture MNE Profits,” Tax Law Review (forthcoming).
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services markets, either as monopoly suppliers or as monopsony purchasers, they 
may impose import or export tariffs and raise revenue at the expense of foreign 
firms. Such tariffs may be optimal from the perspective of the enacting country, 
even if they distort trade and reduce global welfare.13 WTO rules may in principle 
apply to prevent the imposition of some such tariffs, although they are not always 
successful in doing so.
Notably, this type of rationalization of tariffs applies regardless of the types of 
goods or services traded. So-called optimal tariffs may be imposed on non-digital 
goods and services whose production requires substantial fixed and marginal costs. 
The only relevant factor is whether the enacting countries have market power. 
Given that at least some of the countries proposing to enact the DST—for example, 
Spain, Austria, and the Czech Republic—are unlikely to wield any kind of special 
market power with respect to digital services, this explanation of countries’ motiv-
ation for imposing DSTs seems inapplicable.
Recently, the German economist Wolfram Richter advanced an interesting new 
explanation for why small countries might impose tariffs on the import of digital 
services.14 According to Richter, many types of digital services can be supplied 
remotely across the globe at zero marginal cost.15 To charge positive prices for such 
services, multinational companies must establish some kind of market power—for 
example, through intellectual property (IP) right regimes. Richter argues that, under 
certain conditions, it is possible for the service-importing country to enhance 
national welfare by imposing taxes on digital services: the tax revenue collected may 
outweigh the efficiency losses that result from domestic firms choosing to use less 
of the taxed service input. The paradigmatic case for Richter’s analysis is cloud 
computing. An import tariff on domestic firms’ purchase of cloud computing ser-
vices may make domestic firms less efficient; from a national perspective, however, 
this loss of efficiency may be compensated by the surplus expropriated from foreign 
firms.
Interestingly, Richter makes two further arguments. First, the imposition of such 
“optimal tariffs” by small countries may still be globally non-optimal, because, over 
time, it may diminish the quality, if not the quantity (given zero marginal cost), of 
the digital services that multinational firms offer. If each tariff-importing country is 
so small that, by itself, it cannot influence the quality of technology developed else-
where in the world, a “prisoner’s dilemma” may emerge: countries are collectively 
better off by not enacting import tariffs, but it makes sense for each country indi-
vidually to levy such tariffs. Second, WTO mechanisms may have little impact on 
13 Thus the imposition of such tariffs cannot be justified from a global welfare perspective.
14 Richter, supra note 4.
15 This assumption, of course, importantly underlies the justification of the DST as a tax on rent, 
even though it takes the form of a tax on revenue. As discussed below, even opponents of the 
DST have often conceded this assumption. See, for example, Julien Pellefigue, The French 
Digital Service Tax: An Economic Impact Assessment (n.p.: Deloitte Taj, société d’avocats, 
March 21, 2019).
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this type of behaviour, which is individually rational but collectively suboptimal: the 
most that a WTO ruling against the tariff-imposing country can bring about is retal-
iatory sanctions against the country. However, the trade in global technological 
services is already highly asymmetrical, and may become even more so in the future. 
The technology-exporting countries will thus lack proper instruments for retaliation.
Richter thus offers a novel explanation, though not a justification, for hypothet-
ical DSTs imposed on B2B digital services. The explanation does not quite fit 
currently enacted or proposed DSTs, for at least two reasons. First, no DST currently 
applies to the range of B2B services (for example, cloud computing) that Richter is 
interested in, though it is not out of the question that the scope of the DST may in 
the future expand in this direction. Second, given the current design of the DST, 
even if one ignores the quality of technological services, the DST’s tariff-like effects 
may still have distortionary effects, even if it is assumed that the marginal cost of 
advertising is strictly zero. For example, a tariff on advertising purchases may drive 
up the price of advertising for producers in the tariff-imposing country (country X), 
if producers in country X compete with producers from other countries for advertis-
ing slots. That is, the sale of advertisements to country  X producers may have 
opportunity costs, even if it has zero marginal cost of production. Recall that in the 
justification of the DST that I offered above, a basic assumption is that the simulta-
neous deployments of Search Algorithm and Sharing Economy by Googl and AirBB 
in different countries are truly non-rival. This assumption is justified when the tax-
ing right over advertising revenue is conditional on where the target of the 
advertising is located—which is generally the case for current real-world DSTs. But 
this assumption may not be justified for the type of DST considered by Richter.
This leads to one last justification for the DST’s tariff-like features. Earlier, I 
presented the DST as solving two novel problems of international taxation: (1) the 
misalignment between value creation and sources of payment, and (2)  the emer-
gence of a new class of LSR. It may be that ultimately, and in the long term, the 
latter problem is of much greater significance. The non-rival deployment of tech-
nology can be found not just in two-sided business models but also, to a significant 
extent, even in non-digital industries such as pharmaceuticals. The countries of LSR 
may want to capture such rent through tariff-like instruments, and Richter’s argu-
ment shows that when marginal costs of production are zero, even small countries 
might usefully deploy such instruments. What the argument based on the concept 
of LSR adds to Richter’s argument is the following: even when import tariffs are 
globally non-optimal from the perspective of pure efficiency, their justification may 
consist in something more than the self-interested calculation of a particular coun-
try. Import tariffs may possess an additional legitimacy: the rent is located in that 
country, after all.
CAN WE PREDICT  THE INCIDENCE OF  THE DST?
Economic theory suggests that when a tax is imposed on the revenue of a digital 
platform, the incidence of the tax depends first on the platform’s marginal cost in 
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producing this revenue. If the marginal cost is zero, then the tax on revenue is a tax 
on pure profit, and the platform itself bears the tax fully.16 When the platform’s 
marginal cost in producing revenue is not zero, then a variety of outcomes are pos-
sible: the tax may be passed on partially or fully to users, or, in unusual market 
structures, it may still be fully borne by the platform.17 It is also possible for users 
to face a price increase higher in amount than the amount of the tax (an instance of 
“over-passthrough”).
Such theoretical statements naturally seem unsatisfying, because they do not 
offer any intuitive or empirically grounded predictions. However, they can provide 
backing for conclusions derived from common sense. For example, when it is re-
ported that Amazon Marketplace has increased the commission charged to online 
sellers on Amazon.fr to reflect the 3 percent French DST, and that Amazon claims 
that it has no choice but to do so because it is not able to absorb the tax, common 
sense tells us that we should take Amazon’s word with a grain of salt. Platforms 
change their commission fees quite often, and often the reasons that they give for 
doing so are mere excuses.18 Economic theory backs up this common sense by tell-
ing us that no law of economic incidence is at play here. If Amazon’s commission 
were determined entirely by the marginal cost of its offering of services, as would be 
the case in a perfectly competitive market, then the additional cost certainly would 
be passed on. But a claim by Amazon that it operates in a perfectly competitive 
market would simply be implausible.19
Is there any a priori reason to expect a platform to increase the commission it 
charges to merchants as a result of the introduction of the DST? An economic 
16 Hans Jarle Kind and Marko Koethenbuerger, “Taxation in Digital Media Markets” (2018) 20:1 
Journal of Public Economic Theory 22-39 (https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12257).
17 Marc Bourreau, Bernard Caillaud, and Romain De Nijs, “Taxation of A Digital Monopoly 
Platform” (2018) 20:1 Journal of Public Economic Theory 40-51 (https://doi.org/10.1111/
jpet.12255).
18 See Mike Isaac, “How Uber Got Lost: The Once-Swaggering Company Is Losing More 
Money and Growing More Slowly Than Ever, What Happened?” New York Times, revised 
August 23, 2019 (www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/business/how-uber-got-lost.html), reporting 
that Uber announced a new $1 “safe rides fee” in April 2014 that was described as necessary to 
fund “an industry-leading background check process, regular motor vehicle checks, driver 
safety education, development of safety features in the app, and insurance.” For discussion of 
how “the fee was devised primarily to add $1 of pure margin to each trip,” see Connie Loizos, 
“Uber Tries To Reassure Customers That It Takes Safety Seriously, Following NY Times Book 
Excerpt,” Techcrunch.com, August 24, 2019 (https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/24/uber-tries-to 
-reassure-customers-that-it-takes-safety-seriously-following-nytimes-book-exerpt).
19 Compare the report of Amazon’s announcement, supra note 7, to the statement in Thomson 
Reuters, “EXPE—Expedia Group Inc at Citi Global Technology Conference,” edited 
transcript from Citi 2019 Global Technology Conference, New York, September 4, 2019, 
at 5-6 (https://ir.expediagroup.com/static-files/e6ff3f65-a8fa-4ccb-a6e8-d1d5c56faad1), where 
the Treasurer of the Expedia Group announced that the French DST retroactively applicable 
to the beginning of 2019 would be booked by Expedia in Q3 of 2019 and reduce the group’s 
EBITDA.
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 analysis of the French DST, carried out by Deloitte-Taj in April  2019,20 which 
reached a highly unfavourable assessment of the DST, attempts to articulate such an 
a priori reason. This analysis assumes that the platform’s marginal cost of providing 
intermediation services is zero21 and that therefore any passthrough is not caused 
by a change in the relationship between price and marginal costs. Deloitte-Taj of-
fers instead a variety of explanations, to the general effect that merchants’ demand 
for a given online marketplace’s intermediation services is inelastic. Some mer-
chants may be able to stay in business by having only an online presence. Others 
maintain multiple presences on different online platforms, so they may be indiffer-
ent to the commission increase of any particular platform. Merchants’ inelastic 
demand is also supposedly evidenced by users’ continuing to use the platform (that 
is, the lack of “user exodus”) when Esty and Uber previously increased their com-
mission fees. No matter how much weight one might want to give to such claims 
and explanations, they clearly would not prove much: if merchants’ demand for 
platform services were inelastic, why has the platform not previously increased its 
commission in order to earn greater profit? And if we do not assume that firms 
maximize their profit where they can, why do they have to pass on the cost of taxes?
Another popular (and casual) assertion among DST opponents is that the DST 
will ultimately be passed on to final consumers—especially in the jurisdiction that 
imposes the tax. But it is often not clear what this means. Consider the case of the 
DST as it is applied to advertising revenue (as in the Googl example): since advertis-
ing expenditure represents a fixed and not a marginal cost, even if the DST results in 
higher costs for advertising, the claim that merchants would pass on such higher 
costs is generally implausible. Now consider the case of the DST as applied to AirBB 
revenue from guests’ booking accommodation: if AirBB passes on the DST cost, it 
would almost certainly be to final consumers,22 but if the consumers are foreign, the 
DST would be far from pointless.23
Perhaps the most interesting type of DST passthrough to consumers occurs when 
a platform raises prices for one group of users (for example, merchants) in response 
to the tax, and this group of users passes the cost increase on to the other group of 
users (for example consumers). If Amazon Marketplace increases commissions 
charged to online sellers as a result of the DST (note that it is not clear why this 
20 Pellefigue, supra note 15.
21 One might have expected the clients for whom Deloitte Taj produced the study to correct the 
authors of the study if this assumption was demonstrably false.
22 Andrew J. Bibler, Keith F. Telster, and Mark J. Tremblay, Inferring Tax Compliance from 
Pass-Through: Evidence from Airbnb Tax Enforcement Agreements, McMaster University, 
Department of Economics Working Paper no. 2018-06 (Hamilton, ON: McMaster University, 
July 2018) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3117021).
23 An analogy might be to the corporate income tax. One major benefit of the corporate income 
tax is that it allows a country to tax domestic rent earned by foreign investors. This benefit is 
not negated by the fact that the corporate income tax also might be borne by domestic 
investors.
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would be the case), would the online sellers simply increase the prices of online 
goods by the same amount? The Deloitte-Taj study predicts that this would indeed 
happen, and it not unreasonably cites empirical studies from the United States that 
demonstrate that the collection of state sales taxes on online sales increased online 
prices and reduced online sales volume.24 For an online merchant, a higher commis-
sion charged by Amazon seems no different from a higher sales tax on online 
transactions. Yet there are reasons to question even this analogy. Suppose that all 
online and offline sales are already subject to the sales tax (or value-added tax). 
If online and offline sales are perfect substitutes for each other, then online sellers 
cannot pass higher commission fees on to consumers, since the latter have the 
option of making purchases offline. And if online and offline sales are not perfect 
substitutes (for example, if online sellers can achieve better product differentiation 
through online reviews), then online sellers may already be earning some type of 
rent, which may then absorb at least a part of the commission increase.
Overall, although economic theory currently does not generate many useful 
predictions about the incidence of a tax on platforms’ revenue, it does suggest that 
many of the confidential predictions about such incidence are groundless and likely 
only rhetorical. Finally, it is worth noting that such rhetoric, coming from DST 
opponents, may be self-contradictory. This is because another popular line of attack 
on the DST is that it creates the risks of double or excessive taxation on platform 
companies. But if the platform doesn’t even bear the burden of the DST, how does 
the fear of double taxation arise?
“SEE YOU AT  THE OECD!”
I believe that the characterization of the DST as a tax on LSR (akin to resource royal-
ties) is largely consistent with the rationales that governments adopting the DST 
have publicly offered for it. However, it must be acknowledged that no government 
has presented the DST as a standalone tax on LSR. Instead, France and the United 
Kingdom have emphasized that the DST is an interim measure that will be replaced 
once multilateral agreement is reached on a reform of the international rules for 
corporate taxation. The claim seems to be the following: Whatever can be achieved 
under the DST could be better achieved through a re-design of the income tax. 
According to this perspective, the merit of the DST mainly lies in its utility as an 
instigator of a multilateral negotiation process, in particular at the OECD. This is a 
striking stance. Note, for instance, that when the United Kingdom unilaterally 
enacted the diverted profits tax (DPT) in 2015, it did not claim that the DPT was 
temporary and ought to be replaced by multilateral agreements. Presumably, this is 
because the governments promoting the DST anticipate that countries will have 
more interest in revising the international tax regime for digital platforms than they 
had in the policy objectives of the DPT.
24 See, for example, Brian Baugh, Itzhak Ben-David, and Hoonsuk Park, “Can Taxes Shape an 
Industry? Evidence from the Implementation of the ‘Amazon Tax’ ” (2018) 73:4 Journal of 
Finance 1819-55 (https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12687).
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Ironically, the position of DST opponents can similarly be summarized as “See 
you at the OECD!” Their argument is that only multilateral solutions to any pur-
ported problem in taxing digital platforms are legitimate, and that DSTs ought to be 
non-starters. Using DSTs to force countries to come to the OECD negotiation table 
smacks of bad faith and, indeed, makes it much less likely that such negotiation will 
succeed.25 It may come as a surprise to many long-time observers of international 
taxation that, in 2019, multinationals and US politicians unfailingly conjure up an 
image of the OECD as an institution that routinely resolves tough disagreements in 
international taxation. To some, multinationals’ new-found faith in the OECD’s tax 
policy prowess is difficult to accept at face value.
Whose enthusiasm for the OECD is more genuine, the DST’s proponents or its 
opponents? In my view, we face a genuine puzzle here—and the solution to the 
puzzle shows how the conception of the DST as a tax on LSR is useful, even though 
it has not been embraced by any government. The puzzle is the following: typically, 
countries (such as the United States) that wield substantial economic power are the 
ones that can afford to act unilaterally and strategically, while smaller countries with 
less economic power are more interested in cooperation (because they are more 
vulnerable to the impact of strategic action). In the debate over the DST, however, 
smaller countries such as the United Kingdom and France appear to act unilater-
ally first, while the United States appears to advocate for cooperation. What 
explains this counterintuitive configuration?
Consider two alternative characterizations of the core problems facing the inter-
national tax regime today. According to the first characterization,26 the powers of 
the largest multinational companies have expanded dramatically in the last decade, 
as has their ability to dodge taxes on corporate profits. Individual governments face 
growing challenges when it comes to battling by themselves corporate titans on the 
taxation front; these governments must work with one another to rein in these 
corporate titans. The impetus for international cooperation thus issues from the 
25 See Amazon, Google, and Facebook’s testimony for an investigation of the French DST: 
“Pursuant to the Request for Comments Published by the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Google Submits the Following Notice of Intent To Testify and Proposed 
Hearing Statement in Relation to Docket Number USTR-2019-0009,” available on 
Regulations.gov (https://beta.regulations.gov/document/USTR-2019-0009-0015); Amazon, 
International Tax Policy and Planning, “RE: Docket Number USTR-2019-0009—Request 
To Appear at Public Hearing,” submitted to Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
August 12, 2019, available on Regulations.gov (https://beta.regulations.gov/document/USTR 
-2019-0009-0014); Afep, Association of Large French Companies, “Written Comments on 
Section 301 Investigation Regarding the Potential Trade Distortive Impact on the French 
Digital Services Tax (USTR-2019-0009),” July 31, 2019, available on Regulations.gov 
(https://beta.regulations.gov/document/USTR-2019-0009-0004).
26 A compelling expression of this view can be found in Lawrence H. Summers, “Corporations 
Are Cheating the Global Tax System. World Leaders Can’t Afford To Ignore It,” Washington 
Post, April 10, 2019 (www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/10/corporations-are 
-cheating-global-tax-system-world-leaders-cant-afford-ignore-it).
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asymmetry in power between national governments and private companies. Countries 
such as France and the United Kingdom may have experienced such asymmetry 
earlier and more acutely than the United States, and therefore may be more eager 
for international cooperation. And since what is at stake is the ability of all govern-
ments to tax corporate profits under the income tax, the OECD is a natural forum 
where national governments can collectively broker a deal with businesses. From 
this perspective, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States should all 
have a genuine desire for cooperation; their respective desires for cooperation differ 
only in degree.
This first characterization of the fundamental problem of international taxation 
today cannot, of course, explain why France and the United Kingdom would resort 
to unilateral measures in order to instigate multilateral negotiation. A second char-
acterization is more illuminating.27 According to this view, we are entering an age 
in which the increasing asymmetries among countries in respect of technology 
ownership create a long-term bias against the majority of countries (call them 
the technology have-nots) because their ability to raise revenue is less than that of 
technology-rich countries. For example, if corporate returns increasingly accrue to 
intellectual property (IP), and if the ownership of such property becomes, inevitably, 
increasingly concentrated in companies from a few countries, then most countries 
that lack substantial IP ownership face the dire predicament, under the traditional 
income tax, of not being able to tax corporate returns at all. The countries that 
enjoy IP ownership, by contrast, do not face a similar predicament. When countries 
face asymmetrical incentives, cooperation among them may not naturally develop. 
In such situations, it may be individually rational for technology-poor countries to 
adopt, in some circumstances, unilateral measures such as tariffs, withholding taxes, 
or DSTs. Such unilateral actions would remain consistent with the acceptance of the 
superiority of a cooperative solution, whereby the technology-rich countries some-
how allocate more of the corporate tax base to the technology-poor countries. In 
other words, two options are equally acceptable to the technology-poor countries: 
either unilateral measures that directly expropriate some corporate surplus from 
multinationals, or multilateral measures whereby the technology-rich countries 
help to redistribute some corporate surplus in a cooperative fashion.
The last-mentioned cooperative measures would largely be unprecedented. The 
technology-poor countries may offer to carry out the negotiation at the OECD—as 
good an institution as any other for negotiating an unprecedented form of coopera-
tion.28 But the risk of resorting to the OECD is that governments and companies 
from the technology-rich countries may change the topic—for example, back to a 
discussion that ignores the asymmetries between countries. Indeed, it has long been 
27 This view can be found in Richter, supra note 4. See also, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, 
Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018).
28 And systematic redistribution among countries can perhaps be achieved through some kind of 
formulary apportionment under the corporate income tax. See Richter, supra note 4.
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recognized that the income tax treaty framework itself first arose among developed 
countries, in whose advanced economies the balance of trade can be expected to 
even out the give and take between residence and source countries. Many scholars 
have argued that the income tax treaty framework is highly resistant to recognizing 
the asymmetries between developed and developing countries.29 It may thus be quite 
unclear whether the OECD is a good forum for all kinds of international cooperation 
or whether it is capable of sustaining only an old type of cooperation, which fails to 
acknowledge the new problem that is arising in international taxation from national 
asymmetries in technology ownership, and that may be the only type of cooperation 
in which technology-rich countries (and large multinationals) are interested.
In this kind of context, I believe that considerations of unilateral taxes on LSR, 
such as the DST, uniquely advance the discussion. The LSR characterization of the 
DST fundamentally acknowledges technological asymmetry among countries.30 And 
it proposes normative arguments that allow us to see beyond such asymmetry: 
even if platform technologies are invented mainly in the United States, the rent 
earned by the deployment of such technologies elsewhere in the world can coher-
ently and reasonably be seen as arising in these other places. To the extent that such 
arguments are persuasive, they can move us closer to a language that fosters un-
precedented international cooperation and redistribution, the objective of which is 
to undo some of the asymmetries brought about by technology.
29 For a recent critical discussion of this scholarship, see Eric Zolt, “Tax Treaties and Developing 
Countries,” Tax Law Review (forthcoming).
30 In Shaviro’s words, supra note 4, at 46, it is mere unreflective “market triumphalism” to dismiss 
the DST as a desperate policy measure pursued by countries that lag behind the United States 
in nurturing successful digital platforms.
